As examples such as the Monty Hall puzzle show, applying conditioning to update a proba bility distribution on a "naive space", which does not take into account the protocol used, can often lead to counterintuitive results. Here we exam ine why. A criterion known as CAR ("coarsening at random") in the statistical literature character izes when "naive" conditioning in a naive space works. We show that the CAR condition holds rather infrequently. We then consider more gen eralized notions of update such as Jeffrey condi tioning and minimizing relative entropy (MRE). We give a generalization of the CAR condi tion that characterizes when Jeffrey conditioning leads to appropriate answers, but show that there are no such conditions for MRE. This generalizes and interconnects previous results obtained in the literature on CAR and MRE.
INTRODUCTION
Suppose an agent represents her uncertainty about a do main using a probability distribution. At some point, she receives some new information about the domain. How should she update her distribution in the light of this infor mation? Conditioning is by far the most common method in case the information comes in the form of an event. However, there are numerous well-known examples show �ng that naive conditioning can lead to problems. We give JUSt two of them here.
Example 1.1: The Monty Hall puzzle [Mosteller 1965; vos Savant 1990] : Suppose that you're on a game show and given a choice of three doors. Behind one is a car; behind the others are goats. You pick door 1. Before opening door 1, Monty Hall, the host (who knows what is behind each �oor) op�ns door 3, which has a goat. He then asks you If you still want to take what's behind door 1, or to take Joseph Y. Halpern Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853 halpern @cs.cornell.edu www.cs.cornell.edu/homelhalpern what's behind door 2 instead. Should you switch? Assum ing that, initially, the car was equally likely to be behind each of the doors, naive conditioning suggests that, given that it is not behind door 3, it is equally likely to be be hind door 1 and door 2. Thus, there is no reason to switch. However, another argument suggests you should switch: if a goat is behind door I (which happens with probability 2/3), switching helps; if a car is behind door I (which hap pens with probability 1/3), switching hurts. Which argu ment is right? I Example 1.2: The three-prisoners puzzle [Bar-Hillel and Falk 1982; Gardner 1961; Mosteller 1965] : Of three pris oners a, b, and c, two are to be executed, but a does not know which. Thus, a thinks that the probability that i will be executed is 2/3 for i E {a, b, c}. He says to the jailer, "Since either b or c is certainly going to be executed, you will give me no information about my own chances if you give me the name of one man, either b or c, who is going to be executed." But then, no matter what the jailer says, naive conditioning leads a to believe that his chance of execution went down from 2/3 to 1/2. I Why does naive conditioning give the wrong answer in these examples? As argued in [Halpern and Tuttle 1993; Shafer 1985] , the real problem is that we are not condition ing in the right space. If we work in a larger "sophisticated" space, where we take the protocol used by Monty (in Ex ample 1.1) and the jailer (in Example 1.2) into account, �onditioning does deliver the right answer. Roughly speak mg. the sophisticated space consists of all the possible se quences of events that could happen (for example, what Monty would say in each circumstance, or what the jailer would say in each circumstance), with their probability.' However, working in the sophisticated space has problems too. For one thing, it is not always clear what the relevant proba�ilities in the sophisticated space are. For example, what IS the probability that the jailer says b if a is to be 1 The notio � s of "naive space" and "sophisticated space" will be formahz � d m SectiOn 2. This introduction is meant only to g 1 ve an mtmllve feel for the issues. executed? Indeed, in some cases, it is not even clear what the elements of the larger space are. Moreover, even when the elements and the relevant probabilities are known, the size of the sophisticated space may become an issue, as the following example shows. Example 1.3: Suppose that a world describes which of 100 people have a certain disease. A world can be character ized by a tuple of 100 Os and Is, where the ith component is 1 iff individual i has the disease. There are 2 1 00 possi ble worlds. Further suppose that the "agent" in question is a computer system. Initially, the agent has no informa tion, and considers a11 2 1 00 worlds equally likely. The agent then receives information that is assumed to be true about which world is the actual world. This information comes in the form of statements like "individual i is sick or indi vidual j is healthy" or "at least 7 people have the disease". Each such statement can be identified with a set of possi ble worlds. For example, the statement "at least 7 people have the disease" can be identified with the set of tuples with at least 7 Is. For simplicity, assume that the agent is given information saying "the actual world is in set U", for various sets U. Suppose at some point the agent has been told that the actual world is in U1, ... , Un. Then, af ter doing conditioning, the agent has a uniform probability on U1 n ... nUn.
But how does the agent keep track of the worlds it considers possible? It certainly will not explicitly list them; there are simply too many. One possibility is that it keeps track of what it has been told; the possible worlds are then the ones consistent with what it has been told. But this leads to two obvious problems: checking for consistency with what it has been told may be hard, and if it has been told n things for large n, remembering them all may be infeasible. In situations where these two problems arise, an agent may not be able to condition appropriately. I Example 1.3 provides some motivation for working in the smaller, more naive space. Examples 1.1 and 1.2 show that this is not always appropriate. Thus, an obvious question is when it is appropriate. It turns out that this question is highly relevant in the statistical areas of selectively reported data and missing data. Originally studied within these con texts [Rubin 1976; Dawid and Dickey 1977] , it was later found that it also plays a fundamental role in the statistical work on survival analysis [Kieinbaum 1999 ]. Building on previous approaches, Heitjan and Rubin [1991] presented a necessary and sufficient condition for when conditioning in the "naive space" is appropriate. Nowadays this so-called CAR (Coarsening at Random) condition is an established tool in survival analysis. (See [Gill, van der Laan, and Robins 1997; Nielsen 1998 ] for overviews.) We examine this criterion in our own, rather different context, and show that it applies rather rarely.
We then show that the situation is even worse if the in formation does not come in the form of an event. For that case, several generalizations of conditioning have been proposed. Perhaps the best known are Jeffrey conditioning [Jeffrey 1968 ] (also known as Jeffrey' s rule) and Minimum Relative Entropy (MRE) Updating [Kullback 1959; Shore and Johnson 1980] (also known as cross-entropy). Jeffrey conditioning is a generalization of ordinary conditioning; MRE updating is a generalization of Jeffrey conditioning.
We show that Jeffrey conditioning, when applicable, can be justified under an appropriate generalization of the CAR condition. Although it has been argued, using mostly ax iomatic characterizations, that MRE updating (and hence also Jeffrey conditioning) is, when applicable, the only reasonable way to update probability (see, e.g., [Csiszar 1991; Shore and Johnson 1980] ), it is well known that there are situations where applying MRE leads to paradox ical, highly counterintuitive results [Seidenfeld 1986; van Fraassen 198 1] . Example 1.4: Consider the Judy Benjamin problem [van Fraassen 1981] : Judy is lost in a region that is divided into two halves, Blue and Red territory, each of which is fur ther divided into Headquarters Company area and Second Company area. A priori, Judy considers it equally likely that she is in any of these four quadrants. She contacts her own headquarters by radio, and is told "I can't be sure where you are. If you are in Red territory, the odds are 3:1 that you are in HQ Company area ... " At this point the radio gives out. MRE updating on this information leads to a distribution where the posterior probability of being in Blue territory is greater than 1/2. Indeed, if HQ had said "If you are in Red territory, the odds are a : 1 that you are in HQ company area ... ", then for all a ¥ 1, according to MRE updating, the posterior probability of being in Blue territory is always greater than 1/2. I In [Grove and Halpern 1997 ], a "sophisticated space" is provided where conditioning gives what is arguably the more intuitive answer in the Judy Benjamin problem, namely that if HQ sends a message of the form "if you are in Red territory, then the odds are a : 1 that you are in HQ company area" then Judy's posterior probability of being in each of the two quadrants in Blue remains at 1/4. Sei denfeld [1986] , strengthening results of Friedman and Shi mony [1971] , showed that there is no sophisticated space in which conditioning will give the same answer as MRE in this case. (See also [Dawid 2001 ] for similar results along these lines.) We strengthen these results by show ing that, even in a class of much simpler situations (where Jeffrey conditioning cannot be applied), using MRE in the naive space corresponds to conditioning in the sophisti cated space in essentially only trivial cases. These results taken together show that generally speaking, wo rking wi th the naive space, wh ile an attractive approach, is likely to give highly misleading answers. That is the main message of this paper.
We remark that, although there are certain similarities, our results are quite different in spirit from the well-known re sults of Diaconis and Zabell [1986] . They considered when a posterior probability could be viewed as the result of con ditioning a prior probability on some larger space. By way of contrast, we have a fixed larger space in mind (the "so phisticated space"), and are interested in when conditioning in the naive space and the sophisticated space agree.
It is also worth stressing that the distinction between the naive and the sophisticated space is entirely unrelated to the philosophical view that one has of probability and how one should do probabilistic inference. For example, the probabilities in the Monty Hall puzzle can be viewed as the participant's subjective probabilities about the location of the car and about what Monty will say under what circum stances; alternatively, they can be viewed as "frequentist" probabilities, inferred from watching the Monty Hall show on television for many weeks and then setting the proba bilities equal to observed frequencies. The problem we ad dress occurs both from a frequentist and from a subjective stance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formalize the notion of naive and sophisticated spaces. In Section 3, we consider the case where the information comes in the form of an event. We describe the CAR con dition and show by example how rarely it applies. In Sec tion 4 we consider the case where the information is not in the form of an event. We first consider situations where Jef frey conditioning can be applied. We show that Jeffrey con ditioning in the naive space gives the appropriate answer iff a generalized CAR condition holds. We then show that, ex cept in trivial cases, applying MRE in the naive space does not give the appropriate answer. We conclude with some discussion of the implication of these results in Section 5.
NAIVE VS. SOPHISTICATED SPACES
Our formal model is a special case of the multi-agent sys tems framework [Halpern and Fagin 1989] , which is es sentially the same as that used in [Friedman and Halpern 1997 ] to model belief revision. We assume that there is some external world in a set W, and an agent who makes observations or gets information about that world. We can describe the situation by a pair ( w, l), where w E W is the actual world, and l is the agent's local state, which essen tially characterizes her information. W is what we called the "naive space" in the introduction. For the purposes of this paper, we assume that I has the form (o1, ... , on), where o i is the observation that the agent makes at time j, j = 1, ... , n. This representation implicitly assumes that the agent remembers everything she has observed (since her local state encodes all the previous observations). Thus, we ignore memory issues here. We also ignore computa-tiona! issues, just so as to be able to focus on when condi tioning is appropriate.
A pair (w, (o1, ... ,on)) is called a global state. A run is a function from time to global states. Thus, if r is a run, then r(O), r(l), ... is a sequence of global states that, roughly speaking, is a complete description of what happens over time in one possible execution of the system. If r(m) = (w, (o1, ... ,om)), then we letrw(m) = w and ro(m) = (o 1, ... , om)· For simplicity, in this paper, we assume that the state of the world does not change over time, so that rw is a constant function. The "sophisticated space" is the set of all possible runs.
In the Monty Hall puzzle, the naive space has three worlds, representing the three possible locations of the car. The so phisticated space describes what Monty would have said in all circumstances (i.e., Monty's protocol) as well as where the car is. The three-prisoners puzzle is treated in detail in Example 2.1 below. While in these cases the sophisticated space is still relatively simple, this is no longer the case for the Judy Benjamin puzzle. Although the naive space has only four elements, constructing the sophisticated space in volves considering all the things that HQ could have said, which is far from clear, and the conditions under which HQ says any particular thing.
In general, not only is it not clear what the sophisticated space is, but the need for a sophisticated space and the form it must take may become clear only after the fact. For ex ample, in the Judy Benjamin problem, before contacting headquarters, Judy would almost certainly not have had a sophisticated space in mind (even assuming she was an ex pert in probability), and could not have known the form it would have to take until after hearing headquarter's re sponse.
In any case, if the agent has a prior probability on the set n of possible runs in the sophisticated space, after hearing or observing (o1, ... , ok), she can condition, to get a posterior on n. Formally, the agent is conditioning her prior on the set n [ ( o1, ... , ok)] of runs where her local state at time k is (o1, ... ,ok).
Clearly the agent's probability Pr on n induces a proba bility Prw on W by marginalization. We are interested in whether the agent can compute her posterior on W after observing (o1, ... , ok) in a relatively simple way, without having to work in the sophisticated space.
Exam ple 2.1: Consider the three-prisoners puzzle in more detail. Here the naive space is
Wx is the world where x is not executed. We are only in terested in runs of length 1, son = 1. The set 0 of obser vations (what agent can be told) is { { Wa, Wb}, { Wa , we}} .
Here"{ wa, wb}" corresponds to the observation that either Wa or Wb will not be executed (i.e., the jailer saying " c will be executed"); similarly, { Wa, we} corresponds to the jailer saying "b will be executed". The sophisticated space con sists of the four runs of the form (r(O) = ( w., () ); r(l) = (wx, ( { Wx, Wy}) ) where x f. y and { Wx, wy} f. { Wb, We} (since the jailer will not tell a that he will not be executed). According to the story, the prior Prw in the naive space has Prw(w) = 1/3 for wE W. The full prior Pr on R is not completely specified by the story, and will be discussed further in Example 3.3. I
THE CAR CONDITION
A particularly simple setting is where the agent observes or learns that the external world is in some set U � W. For simplicity, we assume that the agent makes only one ob servation, and makes it at the first step of the run 2 Thus, the set 0 of possible observations consists of subsets of W. However, 0 is not necessarily 2 w . Some subsets may never be observed. For example, in Example 2.1, a is never told that he will be executed, so { Wb, we} is not observed. We assume that the agent's observations are accurate, in that if the agent observes U in a run r, then the actual world in r (i.e., rw(O)) is in U. In Example 2.1, accu racy is enforced by the requirement that r(l) has the form ( Wx, ( { Wx, Wy})).
The observation or information obtained does not have to be exactly of the form "the actual world is in U". It suffices that it is equivalent to such a statement. This is the case in both the Monty Hall puzzle and the three-prisoners puz zle. For example, in the three-prisoners puzzle, being told that b will be executed is essentially equivalent to observing { Wa, We} (either a or c will not be executed).
In this setting, we can ask whether, after observing U, the agent can compute her posterior on W by conditioning on U. Roughly speaking, this amounts to asking whether ob serving U is the same as discovering that U is true. This may not be the case in general-observing or being told U may carry more information than just the fact that U is true. For example, if for some reason a knows that the jailer would never say c if he could help it (so that, in particular, if b and c will be executed, then he will definitely say b), then hearing c (i.e., observing { Wa, Wb}) tells a much more than the fact that the true world is one of Wa or Wb. It says that the true world must be wb (for if the true world were wa. the jailer would have said b).
For ease of exposition, in the remainder of this paper we as sume that W and R are finite, and that all nonempty subsets of R are measurable. Moreoever, whenever we speak of a distribution Pr over R, we implicitly assume that the prob ability of any set on which we condition is strictly greater than 0. Let R[ U] consist of all runs in R where the true world is in U (i.e., rw (0) E U). As before, let R[ (U)] 2 We can easily extend the results to allow for multiple obser vations at many steps.
consist of all runs where the agent observes U at the first step. Let Pr be a prior on R and let Pr' = Pr( ·I R[ (U)]) be the posterior after observing U. Thus, we are interested in knowing whether Pr� (V) = Prw (V I U); that is, whether the posterior on W induced by Pr' can be computed from the prior on W by conditioning on the observation. (Ex ample 3.3 below gives a concrete case.) We stress that Pr and Pr' are distributions on R, while Prw and Pr� are distributions on W (obtained by marginalization from Pr and Pr', respectively).
The following simple proposition says that this can be done iff conditioning on U is equivalent to conditioning on ob serving U.
Now the obvious question is when Pr
It is best stated in terms of random variables. Let X w and Xo be two random variables on R, where Xw is the actual world and X o is the first event observed. Thus, (a) JfPr(Xo = U) > 0, thenPr(Xw = w IXo = U) = Pr(X w = w I X w E U) for all w E U.
(b) The event X w = w is independent of the event Xo = U given X w E U, for all w E U;
(c) Pr(Xo = UI Xw = w) = Pr(Xo = UI Xw E U) for all w E U such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0;
The proof of this and all other results can be found in the full paper (available at www.cwi.nl.rpdg). The third and fourth conditions justify the name "coarsen ing at random". Intuitively, first some world w E W is realized, and then some "coarsening mechanism" decides which event U � W such that w E U is revealed to the agent. The event U is called a "coarsening" of w. The third and fourth conditions effectively say that the proba bility that w is coarsened to U is the same for all w E U. This means that the "coarsening mechanism" is such that the probability of observing U is not affected by the spe cific value of w E U that was realized.
The CAR condition explains why conditioning in the naive space is not appropriate in the Monty Hall puzzle or the three-prisoners puzzle. We consider the three-prisoners puzzle in detail; a similar analysis applies to Monty Hall. Note that the sets in on are pairwise disjoint iff Xo can be viewed as a function on W (i.e., its value in a run r is completely determined by rw(O)).
Are there other cases (combinations of W, 0 and distribu tions over R) when CAR holds? There are, but they are somewhat special. Although we have not bothered to try to get a complete characterization of when CAR holds this involves stating a number of linear equalities that must hold, and does not give much insight-the following exam ples show that, in general, it can be very difficult to satisfy CAR.
Example 3.5: Suppose that 0 = {U1, U2 }, and both U1 and U2 are observed with positive probability. (This is the case for both Monty Hall and the three-prisoners puzzle.) Then the CAR condition (Theorem 3.2(c)) cannot hold for both U1 and Uz unless Pr(X w E U1 n U2) is either 0 or 1. For suppose that Pr(Xo = U1) > 0, Pr(Xo = Uz) > 0, and 0 < Pr(X w E U1 n U2 ) < 1. Without loss of generality, there is some WI E ul -Uz and Wz E ul n Uz such that Pr(X w = Wl) > 0 and Pr(X w = w2) > 0. Since observations are accurate, we must have Pr(Xo = ul I X w = wl) = 1. If CAR holds for Ul, then we must have Pr(Xo = U1 I Xw = w2) = 1. But then Pr(Xo = U2 l Xw = w2) = 0. But since Pr(Xo = U2) > 0, it follows that there is some W3 E u2 such that Pr(Xw = w3) > 0 and Pr(Xo = Uzl Xw = w3) > 0. This contradicts the CAR condition. I Example 3.6: Suppose that 0 = {U1, U2 , U3}, and all three observations can be made with positive probability. It turns out that in this situation the CAR condition can hold, but only if (a) Pr(X w E U1 n U2 n U3) = 1 (i.e., all of U1 , U2 , and U3 must hold), (b) Pr(Xw E (U1 n U2 ) -U3) U ((U2 n U3) -U1) U ((U1 n U3) -U2 )) = 1 (i.e., exactly two of U1, U2 , and U3 must hold), (c) Pr(Xw E (U1-(U2 UU3))u(U2 -(U1UU3))u(U3-(U2uUI))) = 1 (i.e., exactly one of U1, U2 , or U3 must hold), or (d) one of (U1-(Uz UU3)) U (U2 nU3), (U2 -(U1 UU3)) U (U1 nU3) or (U3 -(U1 U U2)) U (U1 n U2) has probability I (either exactly one of U1 , U2 , or U3 holds, or the remaining two both hold).
We first check that CAR can hold in all these cases. It should be clear that CAR can hold in case (a). More over, there are no constraints on Pr(Xo = U; I Xw = w) for w E U1 n U2 n U3 (except, by the CAR condition, for each fixed i, the probability must be the same for all w E U1 n U2 n U3, and the three probabilities must sum to I). Case (b) is the most interesting. Let v; be the set where exactly two of U1, U2 , and U3 hold, and U; does not hold, fori = 1, 2, 3. Suppose that Pr(X w E V1 U V2 U V3) = 1.
Note that, since all three observations can be made with positive probability, at least two of V1, V2 , and V3 must have positive probability. If only two of them have posi tive probability, say vl and v2, then it immediately follows from the CAR condition that there must be some a with 0 <a < 1 such thatPr(Xo = U3IXw = w) =a, for all w E V1 U V2 such that Pr(X w = w) > 0. Thus, Pr(Xo = ul I X w = w) = 1a for all wE v2 such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0, and Pr(Xo = U2l Xw = w) = 1-a for all w E V1 such that Pr(X w = w) > 0. If all of vl' v2' and v3 have positive probability, similar arguments
show that the probability of each possible observation must be 1/2. For example, Pr(Xo = ul I X w = w) = 1/2 for all w E V2 U V3 such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0. In case (c), it should also be clear that CAR can hold. More over, Pr(Xo = U; I Xw = w) is either 0 or I, depending on whether w E U;. Finally, for case (d), suppose that Pr(Xw E U1 U (U2 n U3)) = 1. CAR holds iff there exists a such that Pr(Xo = U2l X w = w) = a and Pr(Xo = U3IXw = w) = 1-aforallw E U2nU3 such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0. (Of course, Pr(Xo = U1l Xw = w) = 1 for all w E U1 such that Pr(X w = w) > 0.)
Now we show that CAR cannot hold in any other cases. First suppose that 0 < Pr(X w E U1 n U2 n U3) < 1.
Choose w E U1 n U2 n U3 such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0, and letPr(Xo = U;IXw = w) =a;, fori= 1,2,3. Note that a1 + a2 + a3 = 1. Suppose w' � U1 n U2 n U3 and Pr(X w = w') > 0. By the CAR condition, Pr(Xo = U; I Xw = w') is either a; or 0, depending on whether w' E U; or not. Since Pr(Xo = U1 I X w = w') + Pr(Xo = U2l X w = w') + Pr(Xo = U3l X w = w') = 1, and at least one of these terms is 0, we get the desired contradiction. Similar arguments give a contradiction in all the other cases; we leave details to the reader. I Gill, van der Laan, and Robins [ 1997] show that for every finite set W of worlds, every set 0 of observations, and every distribution Pro over 0, there is a distribution Pr* over n such that the marginal of Pr* over 0 is Pr* and CAR holds. The authors summarize this as "CAR is every thing". Our examples show that the CAR condition puts quite severe restrictions on the distribution Pr* for which CAR holds.
Given that CAR is so difficult to satisfy, the reader may wonder why there is so much study of the CAR condition in the statistics literature. The reason is that some of the special situations in which CAR holds often arise in miss ing data and survival analysis problems. Here is an exam ple. Suppose that the set of observations can be written as 0 = U�= l 0;, where each 0; is a partition of W. Further suppose that observations are generated by the following process. Some i between I and k is chosen according to some arbitrary distribution Prs; independently, w E W is chosen according to Prw. Then the agent is shown U E 0; for the unique U E 0; such that w E U. Intuitively, the partitions 0; represent the observations that can be made with a particular sensor. Thus, Pr s determines the prob ability that a particular sensor is chosen; Prw determines the probability that a particular world is chosen. It is easy to see that this mechanism induces a distribution on n for which CAR holds.
The important special case withO = 01U02,01 = {W }, and 02 = { { w} I w E W} corresponds to a simple miss ing data problem. Intuitively, either complete information is given, or there is no data at all. In this context, CAR is often called MAR: missing at random. In more realis tic MAR problems, we may observe a vector with some of its components missing. In such cases the CAR condi tion often still holds. More generally, Gill, van der Laan, and Robins [1997] show that in several problems of sur vival analysis, observations are generated according to a randomized monotone coarsening scheme under which the CAR condition holds.
BEYOND OBSERVATIONS OF EVENTS

JEFFREY CONDITIONING
In the previous section, we assumed that the information received is of the form "the actual world is in U". But information does not always come in such nice packages. Perhaps the simplest generalization of this is to assume that there is a partition { U 1, ... , U n} of W and the agent ob serves a1U1; ... ;anUn, where a1 +···+·· ·an= 1. This is to be interpreted as an observation that leads the agent to believe Ui with probability aj. for j = 1, ... , n. is taken to be 0. Clearly ordinary conditioning is the spe cial case of Jeffrey conditioning where a; = 1 for some i so, as is standard, we deliberately use the same notation for updating using Jeffrey conditioning and ordinary con ditioning.
We now want to determine when updating in the naive space using Jeffrey conditioning is appropriate. Thus, we assume that the agent's observations now have the form of a1U 1; ... ;anUn for some partition {U1, ... ,Un} ofW.
(Different observations may, in general, use different par titions.) Just as we did for the case that observations are events (Section 3, first paragraph), we once again assume that the agent's observations are accurate. What does that mean in the present context? We simply require that, con ditional on making the observation, the probability of U; really is a; fori = 1, ... , n. That is, fori = 1, ... , n, we have
Pr(X w E U; I Xo = a1 U1; ... ; anUn) =a;. (I) This clearly generalizes the requirement of accuracy given in the case that the observations are events.
Not surprisingly, there is a generalization of the CAR con dition that is needed to guarantee that Jeffrey conditioning can be applied to the naive space.
Theorem 4.1: Fix a probability Pr on R, a partztzon {U1, ... , U n} of W, and probabilities 0<1, ... , <Xn such that a1 + · · · + <Xn = 1. Let C be the observation a1 U1; ... , an U n · Then the following are equivalent:
(a) IfPr(Xo =C) > 0, then Pr(Xw = w I Xo =C)= Prw(w I a1U1; ... ; <XnUn) · (b) Pr(Xo = CIXw = w) = Pr(Xo = CIXw E Ui) for all i = 1, ... , nand w E Ui su ch that Pr(X w = w) > 0.
Part (b) of Theorem 4.1 is analogous to part (c) of Theo rem 3.2. There are a number of conditions equivalent to (b) that we could have stated, similar in spirit to the conditions in Theorem 3.2. Note that these are even more stringent conditions than are required for conditioning to be appro priate.
Examples 3.5 and 3.6 already suggest that there are not too many nontrivial scenarios where applying Jeffrey con ditioning to the naive space is appropriate. However, just as for the original CAR condition, there do exist special situ ations in which generalized CAR is a realistic assumption. For ordinary CAR, we mentioned the situation where the set of observations 0 is a union of partitions, and a specific partition is chosen independently of the process realizing the "actual world" w (see the end of Section 3). For Jeffrey conditioning, a similar mechanism may be a realistic model in some situations where all observations refer to the same partition { U1, ... , U n} of W. We now describe a scenario for such a situation. Suppose 0 consists of k > 1 ob servations C1, ... , Ck with Ci := ai l U1; ... ; <XinUn such that all <Xij > 0. Now, fix n (arbitrary) conditional dis tributions Prj, j = 1, ... , n, on W. Intuitively, Prj is Prw(·l Uj). Consider the following mechanism: first an observation Ci is chosen (according to some distribution Pro over 0); then a set Uj is chosen with probability <Xij (i.e., according to the distribution induced by ci ); finally, a world w E Uj is chosen according to PrJ.
If the observation Ci and world w are generated this way, then the generalized CAR condition holds, that is, condi tioning in the sophisticated space coincides with Jeffrey conditioning. Proposition 4.2 demonstrates that, even though the ana logue of the CAR condition expressed in Theorem 4.1 is hard to satisfy in general, at least if the set {U1, ... , Un} is the same for all observations, then there exist some priors Pr on R for which the CAR-analogue is satisfied for all observations. Below we will see that, in the case of MRE updating, this is not the case any more.
2 MRE UPDATING
What about cases where the constraints are not in the spe cial form where Jeffrey's conditioning can be applied? Per haps the most common approach in this case is to use MRE. Given a constraint (where a constraint is simply a set of probability distributions-intuitively, the distributions sat isfying the constraint) and a prior distribution Pr, the idea is to pick, among all distributions satisfying the constraints, the one that is "closest" to the prior distribution, where the "closeness" of Pr' to Pr is measured using relative entropy. The relative entropy between Pr' and Pr [Kullback and Leibler 195 1; Cover and Thomas 1991] is defined as
The logarithm here is taken to the base 2; if Pr' ( w) = 0 then Pr' ( w) log(Pr' ( w) j Pr( w)) is taken to be 0. This is reasonable since limx-;o x log(xfc) = 0 if c > 0.) The rel ative entropy is finite provided that Pr' is absolutely con· tinuous with respect to Pr, in that if Pr( w ) = 0, then Pr' ( w) = 0, for all w E W. Otherwise, it is defined to be infinite.
The constraints we consider here are all closed and convex sets of probability measures. In this case, it is known that there is a unique distribution that satisfies the constraints and minimizes the relative entropy. Given constraints C and a prior Pr, denote the distribution that minimizes rela tive entropy with respect to Pr given C as Pr( ·I C).
If the constraints have the form to which Jeffrey's Rule is applicable, that is, if they have the form { Pr' : Pr' (Ui) = <Xi, i = 1, ... , n} for some partition {U1, ... , Un}, then it is well known that the distribution that minimizes entropy relative to a prior Pr is Pr( -1 a1U1; ... ,anUn) (see, e.g., [Diaconis and Zabell 1986] ). Thus, MRE updating gener alizes Jeffrey conditioning (and hence also standard condi tioning).
To study MRE updating in our framework, we assume that the observations are now arbitrary closed convex con straints on the probability measure. Again, we assume that the observations are accurate in that, conditional on making the observation, the constraints hold. For now, we focus on the simplest possible case that cannot be handled by Jeffrey updating. In this case, constraints (observations) still have the form a1U1; ... ; anUn, but now the Ui's do not have to form a partition (they may overlap and/or not cover W) and the <Xi do not have to sum to I. Such an observation is accurate if it satisfies (I), just as before.
We now want an analogue to Theorems 3.2 and 4.1 show-ing under what conditions applying MRE updating in the naive space leads to the same results as conditioning in the sophisticated space. Seidenfeld [1986] shows that, un der very weak conditions, no such analogue is possible if the observations have the form "the conditional probability of U given V is a" (as is the case in the Judy Benjamin problem). Here we show that even for observations of the much simpler form a1 U1; ... ; anUn, unless we can reduce the problem to Jeffrey conditioning (in which case Theo rem 4.1 applies), no such analogue is possible in general: if we cannot reduce the problem to Jeffrey conditioning, then MRE updating essentially almost never coincides with sophisticated conditioning.
To demonstrate this, we focus on the simplest possible case. Let 0 consist of two observations (constraints), C; = a;1 U1; a;2U2, i = 1, 2, where U1 -U2, U1 n U2, U2 -U1 and W -(U1 U U2) are all nonempty. We further assume that au, a12, a21, a22 are all in (0, 1). Note that both C1 and C2 refer to the same events U1 and U2.
We say that observation C = a1 U1; a2U2 is Jeffrey like iff, when MRE updating on one of the constraints a1 U1 or a2U2, the other constraint holds as well. That is, C is Jeffrey-like (with respect to Prw) if either Prw(U2I a1UI) = a2 or Prw(UI I a2U2) = a1. Sup pose that Prw(U2Ia1UI) = a2; then it is easy to show that Prw( ·l a1UI) = Prw(·l a1U1; a2U2).
Intuitively, if the "closest" distribution Pr to Prw that sat isfies Pr(UI) = a1 also satisfies Pr(U2) = a2, then Pr is the closest distribution to Prw that satisfies the constraint C = a1U1; a2U2. Note that MRE updating on aU is equivalent to Jeffrey conditioning on aU; (1-a)(W-U).
Thus, if C is Jeffrey-like, then updating with C is equiva lent to Jeffrey updating. The following theorem shows that, in general, if Cis not Jeffrey-like, then there may be no dis tribution Pr over n such that MRE updating coincides with conditioning in the sophisticated space; thus, there can be no equivalent to the CAR condition. 
DISCUSSION
We have studied the circumstances under which ordinary conditioning, Jeffrey conditioning, and MRE updating in a naive space can be justified, where "j ustified" for us means "agrees with conditioning in the sophisticated space". The main message of this paper is that, except for quite spe cial cases, the three methods cannot be justified. Figure I summarizes the main insights of this paper in more detail.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the idea of compar ing an update rule in a "naive space" with conditioning in a "sophisticated space" is not new; it appears in the CAR lit erature and the MRE literature (as well as in papers such as [H alpern and Tuttle 1993] and [Dawid and Dickey 1977] ). In addition to bringing these two strands of research to gether, our own contributions are the following: (a) we show that the CAR framework can be used as a general tool to demistify paradoxes of conditional probability; (b) we show that the CAR condition has a natural extension to cases where Jeffrey conditioning can be applied (Theo rem 4.1); (c) we show that no CAR-like condition can exist in general for cases where only MRE (and not Jeffrey) up dating can be applied (Theorem 4.3).
Our results suggest that working in the naive space is rather problematic. On the other hand, as we observed in the in troduction, working in the sophisticated space (even assum ing it can be constructed) is problematic too. So what are the alternatives?
For one thing, it is worth observing that MRE updating is not always so bad. In many successful practical applica tions, the "constraint" on which to update is of the form � 2:�=1 X; = t for some large n, where X; is the ith outcome of a random variable X on W. That is, we ob serve an empirical average of outcomes of X. In such a case, the MRE distribution is "close" (in the appropriate distance measure) to the distribution we arrive at by sophis ticated conditioning. That is, ifPr" = Prw(·l E(X) = t), Pr' = Pr(·l R[(� 2:�=1 X;= t)]), and Qn denotes then fold product of a probability distribution Q, then for suf ficiently large n, we have that (Pr")n � (Pr\v )n [van Carnpenhout and Cover 1981; Grunwald 2001] . Thus, in such cases MRE (almost) coincides with sophisticated con ditioning after all. (See [Dawid 2001 ] for a discussion of how this result can be reconciled with the results of Sec tion 4.)
But when this special situation does not apply, it is worth asking whether there exists an approach for updating in the naive space that can be easily applied in practical situations, yet leads to better, in some formally provable sense, up dated distributions than the methods we have considered? A very interesting candidate, often informally applied by human agents, is to simply ignore the available extra infor mation. It turns out that in many situations this update rule behaves better, in a precise sense, than the three methods we have considered. This will be explored in future work.
Our discussion here has focused completely on the prob abilistic case. However, these questions also make sense for other representations of uncertainty. Interestingly, in [Friedman and Halpern 1999] , it is shown that AGM-style belief revision [Aichourr6n, Giirdenfors, and Makinson 1985] can be represented in terms of conditioning using a qualitative representation of uncertainty called a plausibil ity measure; to do this, the plausibility measure must sat isfy the analogue of Theorem 3.2(a), so that observations carry no more information than the fact that they are true.
No CAR-like condition is given to guarantee that this con dition holds for plausibility measures though. It would be interesting to know if there are analogues to CAR for other representations of uncertainty, such as possibility measures [Dubois and Prade 1990] or belie/functions [S hafer 1976] .
